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he Declaration of Rights has been part of the 
Constitution of Maryland since our first 
constitution was adopted in 1778. For the great 
majority of that period, the majestic provisions 
found in that document served as the only 
available protection for citizens of this State 
against official abuse of power by their government. 
The revolution in federal constitutional law over the past . 
three decades has changed that. Today, the provisions of;,;-
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States 
apply to both state and federal governments. 1 The Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also has 
proven to be a fertile source for protecting individual rights, 
such as the right to privacy, against state interference. 2 
Those federal protections, backed by a full panoply of 
enforcement agencies3 and federal statutes4 , are so effective 
that the need to have and study a state Bill of Rights no 
longer is obvious. Nevertheless, I propose in this essay to 
show that our Declaration of Rights retains vitality and 
should be studied and thought about today for at least three 
reasons. 5 It teaches us important lessons about our history; 
it guarantees rights which may not otherwise be protected; 
and it may be amended to identify and protect new rights 
in the future. 
The Lessons of History 
' .~ The Declaration of Rights was adopted in 1776, as our 
nation was beginning its rebellion against the arbitrariness 
and despotism of the British government. 6 Its provisions--
the rights it identifies--would be important, even if rendered 
superfluous by the Federal Constitution, because they 
remind us of what the Revolutionary generation thought we 
needed to be protected against. No one who reads that list 
of rights can avoid thinking about how governmental power 
can be abused and how those abuses can be prevented. 7 
This notion is captured at the very beginning of the 
Declaration. Article 1 tells us that "all Government of right 
originates from the People, is founded in compact only, and 
instituted solely for the good of the whole ... "Maryland, 
it is made clear, is not England where sovereignty was 
shared with the King. Rather, the People alone are sovereign, 
3 
and, as a corollary, they have "the inalienable right" to 
change their government "as they may deem expedient." 
There would be no Divine Right of Kings here. 
Article 6 provides another example of the framers' 
concern with authority. That Article proclaims that "all 
persons invested with Legislative or Executive powers of 
Government are Trustees of the Public .... " Now, this 
if not a statement that is enforceable in any practical sense. 
Vet, it conveys the need to hold accountable those entrusted 
with power, a need that the colonists found so unsatisfied 
in British rule. Article 6 also reminds us where enforcement 
ultimately lies -like sovereignty, it rests with the People: 
Wherefore, whenever the ends of Government are 
perverted, and public liberty manifestly endangered 
and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the 
People may, and of right ought to reform the old, 
or establish a new Government . . . . 
Revolution should be a last resort, we are told, but 
revolution then becomes a duty for, as Article 6 
concludes, "the doctrine of non-resistance against 
arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish and 
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind." 
One other example shall have to suffice. Article 8 
provides that "the Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
Powers of Government ought to be forever separate and 
distinct from each other .... "That provision, written 
in 1776 at the start of a civil war, has no counterpart 
in the Federal Constitution, written a decade later, after 
·the Revolution. Those assembled in Philadelphia in 
1787 were keenly aware of, and sympathetic to, the 
principle of separation of powers, but the doctrine is 
only implicit in the document they produced. The framers 
of the Declaration of Rights, with a war still to be fought, 
felt the need to be more explicit about the dangers of 
concentrating authority. 8 
The Federal Constitution 
Does Not Protect Everything 
The Declaration of Rights may also protect rights 
which the Federal Constitution does not. A very recent 
example is Choi v. State. 9 The Court there was 
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presented with the question of whether a witness had waived 
her privilege against compelled self-incrimination, by 
making an earlier statement to the police. The Court, after 
discussing the case law under the Fifth Amendment, found 
that even if the witness had waived her privilege under 
federal law, "she certainly did not waive her privilege ... 
under Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights." 10 
The privilege, in other words, can be asserted at "any stage 
of the inquiry." 
All too often, unfortunately, counsel (and the courts) 
ignore state constitutional law in favor of federal laws, even 
when the state provisions might apply. This is both 
shortsighted and wrong. It is short-sighted because state law 
may provide an answer not found under federal law; it is 
wrong because it ignores a basic judicial responsibility: "(A) 
state court should always consider its state constitution 
before the Federal Constitution. It owes its state the respect 
to consider the state constitutional question even when 
counsel does not raise it, which is most of the time." 11 
It is not enough, however, merely to raise a state 
constitutional question. The meaning of the state constitution 
also must be determined. Instead of a rote recitation, seen 
all too often in opinions, that the state and federal constitu-
tional provisions are in pari materia, the language and 
history of the state constitutional clauses must be examined 
to determine whether their meaning does, indeed, differ 
from that of their federal counterparts. 
A glance through the Declaration of Rights reveals a 
·number of fruitful candidates for that analysis. Article 40 
states that "the liberty of the press ought to be inviolably 
preserved, that every citizen in the State ought to be allowed 
to speak, write and publish his sentiments on all 3Jbj~c~~ 
being responsible for the abuse of that privilege. ·:}.'rbat . ,"'f 
language resembles that of the First Amendment, but it 
certainly does not duplicate it. 12 Are the semantic differences 
real differences? Only a careful analysis of the history of 
Article 40 can reveal that. But certainly, unless that analysis 
is undertaken, one cannot say that Article 40 and the First 
Amendment should be construed in pari materia. 13 
Finally, there are some provisions which might guarantee 
rights which would come as a surprise to those involved. 
Article 41, for example, states: 'That monopolies are 
odious, contrary to the spirit of the free government and the 
principles of commerce, and ought to to be suffered." 
Although this provision has been little used, it reflects a 
belief, strongly held at common law, that state-granted 
monopolies should not exist. 14 Judge Niles wrote in his 
treatise that if the monopoly the state had granted to the 
butchers of New Orleans that was in issue in the famous 
Slaughter House Cases15 were to be tested under Article 
41, the butchers' monopoly would be found unconstitutional 
under the Declaration. 16 A good attorney should be aware 
that possibilities like this reside in the glorious provisions 
of the Declaration of Rights. 17 
A New Meaning 
The importance of the Declaration of Rights, however, 
does not rest solely with what it has meant, or even with 
what it means today. Its importance also inheres in what it 
can become. If the people of Maryland wish it, the 
Declaration of Rights can be amended to guarantee their 
protection from intrusion by the State. 18 A decade and a 
half ago, for example, the Declaration of Rights was 
amended by the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment. 19 
Of course, an amendment could be controversial. 
Consider Roe v. Wade20 , which held that women have a 
right to abort a fetus within the first two trimesters of 
pregnancy. If the Supreme Court were to hold, as seems 
plausible at this writing, 21 that a state may protect the fetus 
(but is not required to) by forbidding an abortion, the 
Maryland Declaration of Rights could be amended-if the 
electorate deems it wise-to provide an express identifica-
tion and guarantee of the right to have an abortion.22 
Conversely, the electorate-if it deemed it wise--could 
amend the Declaration to forbid abortions. 23 
Abortion, of course, is a controversial example. Less 
controversial opportunities for additions to the Declaration 
of Rights can be found easily. Environmental protection 
leaps readily to mind. The immense and fragile resource 
that is the Chesapeake Bay certainly could be placed under 
a special category of constitutional protection, perhaps one 
similar to the "forever Wild" provision of the New York 
Constitution which protects the Adirondack Park. 24 
Conclusion 
The Declaration of Rights of Maryland teaches us about 
the past; it helps protect us in the present; and it may extend 
more protection in the future. Two centuries ago, our 
ancestors realized the need to protect the individual from 
the power of the State. May we never forget that need. 
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4 E.g., 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. 
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